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Abstract 
The supply of credit may increase or decrease following a natural disaster, depending on the 
extent to which banks can absorb risk, and the economic prospects and demand for finance by 
affected firms and households. In this paper, we assess the impact of a natural disaster (Indian 
Ocean Tsunami of 2004) on the aggregate supply of credit to provinces throughout Thailand. 
The results of our investigation suggest that the tsunami has long-lasting negative effects on 
bank lending, albeit the effects are spread unevenly across geographic areas with most of the 
reduction in aggregate lending occurring in severely affected provinces. We also find that the 
presence of bank branches in affected regions mitigates some of the adverse lending effects 
that follow the tsunami. 
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In this paper, we investigate the effects of a sudden and rare natural disaster on bank 
lending. Prior evidence suggests that sudden adverse natural events such as hurricanes, 
volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and floods impact negatively on economic growth (Cavallo et 
al. 2013; Strobl 2011). Bank credit is an important driver of economic growth because it is the 
predominant source of finance to firms and households in most countries (Allen, Carletti, and 
Gu 2015). Disruptions to the flow of bank credit are likely to affect the ease with which firms 
and households can access finance, and ultimately lead to detrimental effects on the real 
economy (Cetorelli 2015).  
Theory differs in predicting how bank lending responds to an adverse shock. Brei and 
Schclarek (2015) develop a model of bank lending in an economy with three main agents: 
banks, depositors and corporate borrowers. They posit that in a time of severe crisis, banks 
reduce lending and increase holdings of liquid assets due to the potential risk of depositor 
withdrawals and the increased risks associated with the investments of borrowers. Bos, Sanders 
and Li (2018) propose a dynamic asset allocation model to explain how banks react to natural 
disasters. The authors suggest that an increase in the risk of disaster leads to an increase in bank 
lending to meet the increased credit. When banks face capital constraints, lending declines and 
remaining resources are reallocated to less risky assets.  
Prior evidence regarding whether bank lending increases or decreases following a 
natural disaster is rather mixed. Some studies show that banks decrease credit supplied to 
affected areas and increase their holdings of government securities (Choudhary and Jain 2017; 
Schüwer, Lambert, and Noth 2018). The decline in bank lending could arise from a decline in 
the value of collateral and the economic prospects of borrowing households and firms in 
affected areas, exposing bank balance sheets to unexpected losses. This reduces the capacity 
of banks to assume more risk via increased lending. Banks may also suffer from a reduction in 
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capital and deposits, which reduces the funds available for lending. In contrast, other evidence 
suggests that bank lending increases in areas affected by natural disasters. Cortés and Strahan 
(2017), for instance, find that banks increase lending in areas affected by hurricanes by cutting 
lending in unaffected areas where banks do not have branches. Chavaz (2016) finds that banks 
with more branches in the hurricane-affected counties increase lending more than provinces 
with fewer branches.  
The ambiguity of prior evidence motivates us to utilise a quasi-natural experiment in 
order to investigate how a natural disaster in the form of the Indian Ocean Tsunami (which 
struck on 26th December 2004) impacts aggregate bank lending in the provinces of Thailand. 
Unlike other natural disasters (such as hurricanes) which arise from seasonal patterns in 
weather conditions or sudden changes in government fiscal and monetary policy (which take 
time to affect the financial system and real economy), tsunamis in the Indian Ocean are 
extremely rare, strike without warning and cause devastation across the geographic areas 
affected. We use this differential geographic impact to overcome identification concerns, and 
investigate whether there is a causal link from a natural disaster to the aggregate lending of 
banks. Given that a tsunami represents an exogenous shock, any subsequent observed changes 
in credit supply are likely to be caused by the shock, and not by coincident changes in other 
relevant economic variables.  
This study is also motivated by the fact that the impact of a natural disaster on bank 
credit and the wider economy depends on the institutional frameworks and level of financial 
development of areas affected (Kahn 2005; Kellenberg and Mobarak 2011). Evidence suggests 
that countries with a developed insurance market suffer less following a natural disaster 
(Melecky and Raddatz 2015). In the absence of insurance to share and consequently mitigate 
risk, affected households and firms have to rely on banks as an alternative source of financing 
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for economic recovery. This provides another justification for our investigation of the impact 
of natural disasters on bank credit supply.1 
The dataset used in the present study comprises information on selected items of 
commercial bank balance sheets at an aggregate provincial level held at the Bank of Thailand, 
and monetary damage and loss estimates associated with the tsunami held at the Asian Disaster 
Preparedness Centre. Based on the theoretical insights of Brei and Schclarek (2015), we 
propose three hypotheses for empirical testing. The first hypothesis contends that following the 
tsunami, aggregate bank lending declines in affected provinces. The second hypothesis 
contends that following the tsunami, aggregate lending in severely affected provinces declines 
more significantly than in the mildly affected provinces. Finally, the third hypothesis contends 
that following the tsunami, there is a long-lasting impact on aggregate bank lending. 
In order to test these hypotheses, we use a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach of 
the type used in prior studies to investigate the differential effects on credit supply of: natural 
disasters (Cortés and Strahan 2017); financial crises (Chava and Purnanandam 2011); and 
regulatory interventions (Berger, Roman, and Sedunov 2016). The DiD approach does not 
require data at individual bank level, and is relatively simple to employ using aggregate data 
of the form utilised in the current study. Moreover, this approach avoids endogeneity issues 
present when comparing heterogeneous entities, given that the influence of unobserved time-
constant effects on the outcome variable have been eliminated through differencing (Bertrand, 
Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004). Therefore, the DiD approach is valuable for evaluating causal 
                                                 
1 Most studies on disasters and bank credit tend to concentrate on developed countries, particularly the US, where 
various forms of ex-ante risk mitigation (such as insurance protection) and ex-post official responses (including 
official government financial assistance schemes) are more prevalent. Due to the lack of detailed data on the level 
of insurance payout, government financial assistance and foreign aid at provincial level, we are unable to verify 
empirically the financial support to regions following the tsunami. However, similar to other developing countries, 
insurance coverage against disasters in Thailand is limited (Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre, 2006). In contrast 
to the US, where typically 50% of losses were covered by insurance payments (e.g. Hurricane Andrew in 1992 
and the Northbridge earthquake in 1994), only 15% of the losses from the Indian tsunami 2004 were covered by 
insurance (Ferguson 2006). In terms of government support, in the US, disaster-affected households receive direct 
monetary support from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). No support is readily accessible 
in Thailand (Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre, 2006).  
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effects. Furthermore, the DiD approach is appropriate when a shock produces an immediate 
effect on the outcome variable of interest (which is likely to be the case for the 2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami event used in the present study).  
The results of the empirical analysis suggest that following the tsunami, aggregate bank 
lending declines in affected provinces compared to unaffected provinces. These effects are 
spread unevenly across geographic regions with most of the reduction in aggregate lending 
occurring in provinces most affected by the tsunami. Moreover, the tsunami has a long-lasting 
negative effect on aggregate bank lending, which dissipates after an extended period (of 22 
months). We also find that the number of bank branches located in affected regions mitigates 
some of the adverse effects on credit supply following the tsunami.  
We contribute to the growing literature on the impact of natural disasters on bank credit 
supply. We complement prior theoretical contributions that predict a negative effect of disasters 
on bank lending (Brei and Schclarek 2015). We find that the reduction in bank credit supply 
differs significantly between geographic regions depending on the severity of the exogenous 
shock (Bos, Sander, and Li 2018). Moreover, we find that the physical presence of banks in 
affected areas fosters the flow of credit. This supports the findings of prior research which 
suggest that banks with a physical presence (number of branches) in distaster affected areas 
increase lending more than provinces with a lower physical presence (Chavaz 2016). 
Second, we augment prior evidence on the impact of exogenous events on bank 
aggregate lending. Previous studies show that disruptions to aggregate bank lending have a 
significant impact on firm investment and economic growth (Amiti and Weinstein 2018; Peek, 
Rosengren, and Tootell 2003). We show that a sudden natural disaster can have a long-lasting 
effect on aggregate bank lending. As such, we provide evidence on the impact of a rare disaster 
on aggregate bank lending in a setting where banks act as the primary source of financing for 
firms and households. The evidence from our analysis of aggregate bank lending also 
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complements prior research that uses micro-level (loan) data to assess the impact of exogenous 
shocks to bank credit supply. For example, Jiménez et al. (2012) show that strict monetary 
policy and deteriorating economic conditions reduce the provision of bank credit.  
Third, we augment a handful of recent bank-level studies, which show that natural 
disasters impact credit supply in developed economies (Chavaz 2016; Cortés and Strahan 2017; 
Garmaise and Moskowitz 2009; Hosono et al. 2016; Schüwer, Lambert, and Noth 2018).2 In 
the current context, we present evidence of the impact of a natural disaster in a developing 
economy where insurance protection and official financial assistance (which can act as 
mechanisms for risk transfer and augment the capacity of borrowers to cope with unexpected 
events) are limited. In the absence of such mechanisms, it is likely that households and firms 
in affected areas would have to turn to banks as a major financing source for recovery after 
disasters. This would signify the positive role that bank credit plays in any economic recovery 
following a natural disaster (Becchetti and Castriota 2011; De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 
2012). 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a background 
and context to the present study. In Section 3, we discuss the data set used and provide a 
descriptive analysis of aggregate bank lending. Section 4 outlines the estimable model and 
presents the results of the empirical analysis. In Section 5, we execute a battery of additional 
tests in order to check the robustness of the main results presented in S ection 4. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Background  
                                                 
2 Basker and Miranda (2018) focus on how a severe weather shock affects smaller firms that rely on more informal 
forms of finance such as loans from friends and family and even credit-card debt. They find that smaller and less 
productive firms that incurred physical damage during hurricane Katrina were less likely to survive. 
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 Tsunamis occur following large-scale disturbances in the ocean. The most common 
cause is an earthquake under the sea, which creates an explosive vertical motion leading to a 
sudden rise and fall of the sea level. Major tsunamis are generated by earthquakes with 
magnitudes exceeding 7.0 on the Richter scale and which take place less than 30 kilometres 
beneath the surface of the earth. The resulting tsunami propagates as a series of waves, which 
involve the movement of water all the way to the sea floor. In the open ocean, a tsunami is 
barely noticeable. However, as a tsunami approaches the coastline, the wave height and the 
speed of the current increase dramatically. The resulting waves can reach up to 30 metres high 
and last for several hours.3 
 On 26th December 2004, a powerful earthquake measuring 9.1 on the Richter scale, 
with its epicentre just off the Northern part of Sumatra, Indonesia, created a tsunami that 
affected many countries from Asia to Africa. The unexpectedness of the tsunami and the lack 
of prior warning meant that the devastation and fatalities were spread throughout countries 
around the Indian Ocean. Within two hours, the tsunami had claimed over 63,000 lives in 
Thailand, Sri Lanka and India (Bernard et al. 2006). In Thailand (the geographic focus of the 
present study), the tsunami killed 8,000 people and caused severe damage to property, fishing 
vessels, housing, infrastructure and agricultural crops.4 The tsunami flooded coastal areas two 
to three kilometres inland. The affected areas (shown in Figure 1) were contaminated with salt 
water to the detriment of agricultural production and water quality (UNEP 2005). There were 
sizeable declines in the productive capacity of the real economy. According to estimates 
reported by the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre, the two most affected industries 
                                                 
3 See: NOAA at http://wcatwc.arh.noaa.gov/?page=tsunami_science; Australian Bureau of Meteorology at 
http://www.bom.gov.au/tsunami/info/faq.shtml 
 
414 countries were affected by the tsunami. In descending order numbers of fatalities these were: Indonesia, Sri 
Lanka, India, Thailand, Somalia, the Maldives, Malaysia, Myanmar, Tanzania, Bangladesh, the Seychelles, South 
Africa, Yemen, and Kenya. We focus on Thailand because it was among the most severely affected countries, and 
because regional bank lending data is available at a relatively high frequency (monthly intervals) from the central 
bank. This enables us to capture the impact of the tsunami on bank lending in a timely fashion. Datasets for other 
affected countries are not available to us.   
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(accounting for over 90% of total recorded losses) were tourism, with losses of THB71972 
million, and fisheries, with losses of THB6481 million (Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre 
2006). 
 
[Figure 1 near here] 
 
In Thailand, the geographic areas most affected by the tsunami were the six provinces 
in the south of the country, comprising Krabi, Phangnga, Phuket, Ranong, Satun and Trang. 
These six provinces are classified as affected areas in the present study. Table 1 provides a 
summary of the economic impact of the tsunami in these six affected areas. Overall, the 
cumulative economic impact accounted for approximately 50% of the total economic output of 
these provinces. However, most of the impact of the tsunami was concentrated in the Krabi, 
Phangnga and Phuket provinces. In these provinces, average losses and damages exceeded 75% 
of annual output. This is far higher than the recorded losses (of less than 10% of annual output) 
in the Ranong, Satun and Trang provinces. 
 
 [Table 1 near here] 
 
3. Data and descriptive analysis 
We collect data on damages and losses incurred in the 75 Thai provinces from the Asian 
Disaster Preparedness Centre. This dataset is assembled using a disaster assessment 
methodology developed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean. 
We collect data on aggregate bank deposits and loans at monthly frequency from the 
statistics of financial institutions produced by the Bank of Thailand (Bank of Thailand 2015). 
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This data source provides data on selected items of commercial bank balance sheets and the 
number of bank branches at provincial level in 75 provinces located within four geographic 
regions (Central, Northern, North-eastern and Southern). An obvious limitation of this 
aggregate data is that it does not allow us to investigate how lending behaviour changes across 
individual banks. However, the relatively high frequency of aggregate data does allow us to 
construct a panel at monthly (rather than quarterly or yearly) intervals, and capture the effects 
of the tsunami on bank lending in a timely fashion. 
 
Classification of affected provinces 
 We partition the geography of Thailand into affected and unaffected provinces based 
on the extent of monetary damages and losses estimates compiled by the Asian Disaster 
Preparedness Centre. Six provinces (shown in Table 1) are classified as affected, while the 
remainder are unaffected. In order to test if any change in bank lending is sensitive to the 
severity of destruction recorded, we partition the affected provinces further into two groups. 
The severely affected group (Krabi, Phangnga and Phuket) includes provinces in which the 
impact (measured as the ratio of the monetary value of damages and losses to province-level 
domestic product in the previous year) was above the average for all affected provinces. Areas 
where the impact was below the average for all affected provinces form the mildly affected 
group (Ranong, Satun and Trang).  
 
Descriptive analysis 
 A descriptive summary of the variables used in the empirical analysis is presented in 
Table 2. The time horizon is 24 months around the date of the tsunami. The main (dependent) 
variable of interest is ‘loan growth’ measured as the percentage monthly change in aggregate 
bank lending in a given province. Across the three groups of provinces (severely affected, 
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mildly affected, unaffected), loan growth is lowest in the severely affected group. Moreover, 
loan growth in this group is volatile, evidenced by a much higher standard deviation, and a far 
larger gap between the minimum and maximum growth rates in lending than those calculated 
for the mildly affected and unaffected groups. This volatility is likely to reflect the contrast in 
lending growth pre- and post-tsunami. 
 We do not observe similar patterns in other variables. Average ‘deposit’ in severely 
affected areas is higher than the averages of other provinces. This reinforces our expectation 
that any decline in lending is not caused by a change in bank deposits.     
 
[Table 2 near here] 
 
A preliminary analysis of the evolution of bank lending in severely affected, mildly 
affected and unaffected provinces before and after the tsunami is shown in Figure 2. In the 12 
months prior to the tsunami, there is a similar pattern in bank lending growth across provinces. 
Aggregate bank lending in severely affected provinces is significantly higher than that in mildly 
affected and unaffected provinces. There was a parallel trend in bank lending growth in these 
three areas for several months prior to the tsunami. 5  
Following the tsunami, the growth of aggregate bank lending in the severely affected 
provinces falls below that to areas unaffected by the Tsunami. In severely affected provinces 
aggregate bank lending declines to a record low in the two months following the tsunami. In 
contrast, aggregate bank lending in mildly affected provinces does not show a significant 
change after the tsunami. Overall, our descriptive analysis suggests that following the tsunami, 
                                                 
5 In using the difference-in-difference approach (outlined in Section 4), we assume that the trend in aggregate 
lending is similar for both affected and unaffected provinces in the pre-shock period. This is supported by Figure 




aggregate lending changes dramatically in the severely affected areas, but not in the mildly 
affected and unaffected provinces.  
 
[Figure 2 near here] 
 
 In order to assess whether the difference in aggregate lending between affected and 
unaffected groups is statistically significant, we first classify the 75 provinces into affected and 
unaffected groups, and into pre- and post-tsunami periods (measured at monthly intervals). We 
then compare changes in aggregate loan growth within each group over time and across 
affected and unaffected groups. We expect a univariate test to yield a negative and significant 
coefficient for the difference in loan growth within the affected group, and an insignificant 
coefficient within the unaffected group. The coefficient for the difference across affected and 
unaffected groups should also be negative. 
Table 3 presents the results. As expected, within the affected group of provinces, the 
coefficient (Diff1) is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that aggregate bank 
lending declines in the post-tsunami period. Within the unaffected group of provinces, 
however, the coefficient (Diff2) is approximately zero and insignificant, suggesting no 
difference in lending growth within this group before and after the tsunami. This suggests that 
aggregate bank lending in the affected provinces reacts negatively to the tsunami. It also allows 
us to rule out the possibility that (when drawing a comparison across the two groups) any lower 
growth in lending in the affected group is merely a reflection of an increase in lending in the 
unaffected provinces.   
The coefficient for the difference across the affected and unaffected groups (Diff1-
Diff2) is negative and significant at the 1% level. This supports our hypothesis that bank 
lending declines after the tsunami. The larger standard deviation of loan growth in the affected 
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provinces in the months following the tsunami is an additional indication of the negative impact 
of the tsunami on bank lending. 
  
[Table 3 near here] 
 
4. Methods and results 
In order to explore the impact of the tsunami on aggregate bank lending, we conduct an 
empirical analysis as follows. First, we investigate the impact of the tsunami on aggregate bank 
lending across all affected provinces. This allows us to test formally our first hypothesis, which 
contends that following the tsunami, aggregate bank lending in affected provinces declines. 
Second, we partition the affected provinces into mildly and severely affected areas. This allows 
us to test directly our second hypothesis, which contends that following the tsunami, aggregate 
lending in severely affected provinces declines more significantly than in mildly affected 
provinces. Third, we investigate our third hypothesis which contends that following the 
tsunami, there is a lasting impact on aggregate bank lending. 
 
Tsunami effects on bank lending 
 In order to test our first hypothesis, we estimate the following model: 
∆𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝,(𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡−1) = 𝛽𝛽�𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝  ×  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� + �𝜏𝜏𝑛𝑛𝑿𝑿𝑛𝑛,𝑝𝑝,𝑟𝑟,(𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡−1)
3
𝑛𝑛=1
+ 𝜑𝜑𝑝𝑝 +  𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝,𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡     (1) 
 where p denotes provinces, r regions and t months. The dependent variable ∆𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝,𝑡𝑡  is 
bank lending measured by the percentage change in aggregate outstanding loans of commercial 
banks in province p between month t and month (t-1). 
 (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝 × 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) is an interaction variable which is the product of a dummy 
variable for the tsunami affected areas (which equals one if affected and zero otherwise) and a 
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dummy variable for the months after the tsunami (which equals one for months post-tsunami 
and zero otherwise). This variable captures the effects of the tsunami on bank lending growth. 
Given that the tsunami occurred on 26th December 2004, January 2005 is the first month after 
the event. We estimate a baseline model using a 24-month time horizon (1st January 2004 to 
24th December 2005) around the tsunami. β is the key parameter of interest. β < 0 implies that 
bank lending in affected provinces decreases following the tsunami compared to unaffected 
areas. β > 0 implies the opposite.  
 𝑿𝑿𝑛𝑛,𝑝𝑝,𝑟𝑟,(𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡−1) are the control variables. ‘bank branch’ is the natural logarithm of the 
number of branches of commercial banks in province p in month (t-1). The number of branches 
may impact on the aggregate level of bank loans extended to borrowers within a particular 
province (Chavaz 2016). Prior evidence suggests that despite advances in credit-scoring 
technologies (Filomeni et al. 2016), bank-borrower geographic proximity does matter in 
increasing the probability of commercial loan approval (Brevoort and Hannan 2006) at lower 
rates of interest (Degryse and Ongena 2005). This is particularly the case in developing 
countries, where soft information on borrowers and knowledge of local economic conditions 
play a significant role in the screening, processing and approval of loans (Agarwal and 
Hauswald 2010).  
‘deposit’ denotes the percentage change in the aggregate deposits of commercial banks 
in province p between month t and (t-1). We control for the change in deposits given that this 
is the main source of bank liabilities used to finance assets, especially in developing countries.6 
                                                 
6 In the 24-month time horizon around the tsunami, the loan-to-deposit ratio is approximately 90% on average. 
However, the inclusion of deposits as a control might lead to some potential issues because the tsunami could 
affect bank deposits, which in turn are correlated with loans (Atanasov and Black 2016). For example, if deposits 
decrease after the shock because firms and households withdraw cash from banks in order to cope with losses, 
this reduces the funds available for banks to make loans. This effect of the tsunami would not be picked up by the 
estimated β coefficients. Alternatively, if deposits increase because firms and households cash out insurance and 
deposit the money into banks, while the reconstruction and repairs to fixed assets are completed, the estimated β 
coefficients are likely to be overstated. The second possibility is less likely because insurance coverage in Thailand 
is rather limited. However, to check if these possibilities can cause the form of bias identified above, we run a 
difference-in-differences estimator in which deposits are considered as the outcome (instead of loans). The results 
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As theory suggests a positive correlation between lending and deposits (Brei and Schclarek 
2015), we expect that higher aggregate bank deposits are associated with more lending. 
 ‘trend’ denotes percentage change in aggregate loans in region r between month t and 
(t-1). This variable is included to capture the pre-treatment parallel trend assumption associated 
with the difference-in-differences estimator (Atanasov and Black 2016). 𝜑𝜑𝑝𝑝 and 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡 are 
province and month fixed effects. 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝,𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡 is the error term. We estimate Equation (1) using OLS 
with robust standard errors clustered at province level.7  
 
Tsunami effects in mildly and severely affected areas 
 The impact of a natural disaster on bank lending may vary according to the severity of 
the event in a given geographic area. Firms and households in mildly affected areas are likely 
to suffer less following a natural disaster given that the loan portfolios and risk-taking capacity 
of banks located in these areas are only partially affected. Consequently, aggregate bank 
lending is likely to decrease by a smaller amount in mildly affected relative to severely affected 
geographic areas. This is in line with theory, which predicts a decline in lending when banks 
face financial constraints because of the severity of natural disasters (Bos, Sanders, and Li 
2018). 
                                                 
suggest no statistical differences in deposit growth between affected and unaffected provinces before and after the 
tsunami. These findings alleviate our aforementioned concerns. 
 
7 An empirical challenge in our study is to isolate shocks to loan supply from shocks to the demand for credit. 
The use of province- and month-fixed effects in all of the regressions should absorb the demand effects. In 
interpreting the results from Equation (1), we assume that credit demand increased after the tsunami. This 
assumption is made on the following basis. First, earlier studies in developing countries find that credit demand 
increases after natural disasters (Berg and Schrader 2012; Czura and Klonner 2010). Second, given the extensive 
damage caused by the tsunami (as discussed in Section 2), it is reasonable to assume that demand for credit 
increases because firms and households require funds for reconstruction. If credit demand increases, changes in 
bank lending can be attributed to supply side considerations. In order to support our assumptions, empirically, we 
tried to control for demand side effects by including the number and value of investment projects of the corporate 
sector. The results (reported in Table A.1) are similar to those from the main estimation in Equation (1). However, 
because these data are for approved foreign investment projects only and thus do not fully reflect local credit 
demand, we use these variables as a robustness test only. Further research could usefully engage in compiling dis-




In order to investigate whether there is a differential impact of the tsunami on aggregate 
bank lending across affected areas, we divide affected provinces (based on the respective ratio 
of estimated damages and losses to total gross economic output of a given province in the year 
prior to the tsunami) into mildly and severely affected. We then investigate the impact of the 
tsunami on aggregate bank lending in severely and mildly affected provinces using Equation 
(2).  
∆𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝,(𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡−1) = 𝛽𝛽1�𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝  ×  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� + 𝛽𝛽2�𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝  ×  𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡� + �𝜏𝜏𝑛𝑛𝑿𝑿𝑛𝑛,𝑝𝑝,𝑟𝑟,(𝑡𝑡,𝑡𝑡−1)
3
𝑛𝑛=1
+ 𝜑𝜑𝑝𝑝 +  𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝,𝑟𝑟,𝑡𝑡     (2) 
(𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝 × 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) is the interaction between severely affected provinces (Krabi, 
Phangnga and Phuket) and the months following the tsunami. (𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝 × 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) is the 
interaction between mildly affected provinces (Ranong, Satun and Trang) and the months 
following the tsunami. The base category is the interaction between unaffected provinces and 
the months following the tsunami 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 summarise the results of estimating Equation (1). ?̂?𝛽 is 
negative and statistically significant (similar to the results of our univariate analysis presented 
in Table 3). This implies that bank lending in affected provinces declines compared to 
unaffected provinces, and suggests that the tsunami produces an adverse impact on bank credit 
supply. Our finding contrasts with some recent bank-level evidence, which explores the impact 
of natural disasters on bank credit in developed economies (Chavaz 2016; Cortés and Strahan 
2017), but is consistent with others (Choudhary and Jain 2017; Garmaise and Moskowitz 2009; 
Schüwer, Lambert, and Noth 2018). Overall, we show that a rare disaster (in the form of a 
tsunami) affects bank lending negatively.  
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 4 present the results of testing our second hypothesis as 
specified in Equation (2). The results reveal differences in the extent to which the tsunami 
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impacts on bank lending in different provinces. Specifically, the coefficient for the interaction 
between severely affected provinces and the post-tsunami period (?̂?𝛽1) is negative and 
significantly different from zero. This shows that the tsunami has an adverse impact on bank 
lending in severely affected provinces. The coefficient for the mildly affected provinces (?̂?𝛽2), 
(on the other hand) is insignificant, with a value close to zero. This indicates that bank lending 
in mildly affected provinces does not change relative to lending in provinces that were 
unaffected by the tsunami. In other words, the tsunami does not cause bank credit supply to 
change in less affected provinces. The difference between the two coefficients in terms of 
statistical significance suggests that the decline in aggregate bank lending is concentrated 
within severely affected provinces, and it is this that drives the observed decline in aggregate 
bank lending. 
 Turning to our control variables, the number of bank branches is positively related to 
bank lending. This result supports the view that physical proximity to borrowers allows banks 
to collect soft information, which can be processed effectively to increase lending (Agarwal 
and Hauswald 2010; Brevoort and Hannan 2006). Our results suggest that any negative effects 
of the tsunami on lending growth are mitigated by the presence of branches (through which 
banks can maintain lending relationships with borrowers after the disaster based on information 
collected previously). The result is consistent with the findings of Chavaz (2016) that banks 
with fewer branches in hurricane-affected counties reduce lending more than those with more 
branches. The coefficient on deposits is positive. This is unsurprising given that deposits are 
the predominant source of bank financing in developing countries. However, it is not 
statistically significant. 
 




The longer term impact of the tsunami on aggregate bank lending 
 In order to test the hypothesis that the tsunami causes a long-term impact on aggregate 
bank lending, we specify a model (Equation 3) where affected areas are divided into severely 
and mildly affected. The two parameters of interest are 𝜖𝜖(𝑡𝑡+𝑚𝑚) and 𝜋𝜋(𝑡𝑡+𝑚𝑚). 




+ 𝜑𝜑𝑝𝑝 +  𝜔𝜔(𝑡𝑡+𝑚𝑚) + 𝜀𝜀𝑝𝑝,𝑟𝑟,(𝑡𝑡+𝑚𝑚)     (3) 
 All variables are defined as in Equation (1) and Equation (2). In Equation (3), t 
represents the 12-month period prior to the occurrence of the tsunami; m represents each 
additional month following the tsunami until any effects dissipate. We anticipate a diminishing 
effect of the tsunami. As a result,  𝜖𝜖(𝑡𝑡+𝑚𝑚) and 𝜋𝜋(𝑡𝑡+𝑚𝑚) (m = 1, 2, 3, …, d, where d is the month 
from which the impact of the tsunami dissipates) are expected to increase over time from a 
large negative value towards zero. In other words, we expect the difference in lending between 
the unaffected and affected provinces to decline as the effects of the shock diminish. There are 
d regressions to be estimated. 
 Figure 3 depicts the lasting impact of the tsunami on bank lending using the coefficients 
for the severely affected (𝜖𝜖(𝑡𝑡+𝑚𝑚)) and mildly affected provinces (𝜋𝜋(𝑡𝑡+𝑚𝑚)) from Equation (3). 
Consistent with our earlier results, bank lending in severely affected provinces declines 
significantly following the tsunami. The largest decline in aggregate bank lending in these 
provinces is recorded two months after the tsunami. The effects of the tsunami dissipate over 
time before disappearing completely after 22 months. 
 A slightly different trend is observed for mildly affected provinces, where there is an 
increase in lending in the three months following the tsunami. After three months, aggregate 
bank lending declines gradually. The difference in lending between mildly affected and 
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unaffected provinces is negligible after 11 months. The evidence reveals that aggregate bank 
lending declines more in provinces where the tsunami causes more extensive damage.  
 
[Figure 3 near here] 
 
 In summary, the results of our empirical analysis suggest that the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
significantly reduces aggregate bank lending in affected provinces. Further analysis suggests 
that the tsunami generates a long-lasting impact on (provincial) lending in the most severely 
affected areas for up to 22 months. This period is twice as long as that observed for developed 
economies (Cortés and Strahan 2017). This significantly longer-lasting impact is likely to 
reflect the differences between developing and developed countries regarding arrangements 
and support for mitigating disaster risk (Kellenberg and Mobarak 2011; Kahn 2005). The 
limited availability of risk-sharing mechanisms such as private insurance and various official 
financial assistance schemes may have hindered banks from supporting firms and households 
in tsunami-affected areas. The number of bank branches in contrast increases lending, which 
to some extent mitigates the overall decline in lending in affected provinces (Chavaz 2016).   
 
5. Robustness tests 
The results of our empirical analysis suggest that the Indian Ocean Tsunami had a 
significant negative impact on credit supply. Moreover, our findings suggest that the effects 
are distributed unevenly across geographic areas, with those most severely affected by the 
tsunami experiencing the largest declines in the supply of credit. In this section, we check the 
robustness of our estimates of the effects of the tsunami on aggregate bank lending to common 




Different time windows 
First, we investigate the sensitivity of our observed results to different time horizons. 
We narrow the original 24-month time horizon to 18 months, 12 months and six months, and 
then re-estimate Equation (2). The results (reported in Table A.2 of the Appendix) are 
consistent with the main findings above. Noticeably, the key coefficients for longer time 
horizons (Columns 1 and 2) have smaller magnitudes than those for shorter time horizons 
(Columns 5 and 6). This reflects the diminishing effects of the tsunami on bank lending over 
time. 
 
Placebo tests  
 We test whether the estimated difference in aggregate bank lending between affected 
and unaffected provinces is attributable to the impact of the tsunami or whether, in fact, this 
arises from some other cause. In order to test this, we first falsify the date of the tsunami. This 
falsification disrupts the correct assignment of the tsunami date, but maintains the identity of 
the provinces affected by the tsunami. We also conduct a second test where we falsify the 
location of the affected provinces. In this test, the affected provinces are assigned incorrectly, 
while the actual date remains unchanged. 
We re-run our estimation as shown in Equation (2). If the decline in bank lending is 
caused by an unobservable shock that either predates or coincides with the tsunami, we should 
still find a significant decline in bank lending. The results of these tests, reported in Table A.3 
(falsified dates of the tsunami) and Table A.4 (falsified location of the affected provinces), 
provide strong evidence that the tsunami causes the observed changes in aggregate bank 
lending.  
 
Serial correlation  
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An inherent limitation of the difference-in-differences method is the inconsistency of 
the standard error of the key estimate if the outcomes are serially correlated (Bertrand, Duflo, 
and Mullainathan 2004). This could be an issue in the present study given that we use a long 
time series of 24 months around the tsunami. In order to address this problem, we ignore the 
time series by averaging the variables across two separate, pre- and post-tsunami, periods, and 
re-estimating Equation (2). The results, shown in Table A.5, confirm our earlier findings.  
 
Parallel trend assumption 
A critical assumption underlying the difference-in-differences approach is that lending 
in affected and unaffected areas should follow a common trend in the absence of the tsunami. 
Even though visual evidence in Figure 2 lends some support to this assumption, we carry out 
two additional tests. 
In the first test, a group of provinces neighboured with the affected provinces is used 
as a control group. These neighbouring provinces share common characteristics (in terms of 
cultural, socioeconomic factors) with the affected provinces. The results of this robustness test 
are shown in Table A.6. The main findings from our empirical analysis are once again 
supported. 
In the second test, we create a matched sample as a control group based on a propensity 
score matching exercise. We use the predicted propensity scores and conduct a one-to-one 
nearest-neighbour matching without replacement to match the tsunami-affected provinces with 
unaffected provinces. The results from this estimation (reported in Table A.7) are also 





 The supply of bank credit is of crucial importance for the health of the economy. This 
is especially the case in developing countries, where bank credit is the predominant source of 
finance to households and firms. To date, most studies that have investigated the effects of 
exogenous shocks on bank credit supply are confined to developed economies. The paucity of 
evidence for developing economies motivates the present study. 
 We exploit the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 to investigate the effects of an 
exogenous shock to commercial bank lending in Thailand. We test a series of hypotheses. First, 
we examine whether aggregate lending in affected provinces decreases after a tsunami. Second, 
we investigate whether following a tsunami, the decline in lending in severely affected 
provinces is more significant than in mildly affected geographic areas. Finally, we investigate 
whether a tsunami generates a long-term effect on regional (provincial) bank lending. 
 Employing the difference-in-differences approach, we find that following the tsunami, 
there is a significant decline in the aggregate supply of credit to affected provinces. Among the 
affected areas, we find that the decline in lending in affected provinces is driven by changes 
taking place in provinces that were most severely affected by the tsunami. We also find that 
the presence of bank branches in affected regions mitigates some of the adverse lending effects 
that follow the tsunami. These results are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks and searches 
for alternative causes.  
 The results of this study have relevance for policymakers tasked with overseeing the 
smooth functioning of the banking system during normal and stressed periods. First, the lack 
of official government financial assistance is likely to be a key factor in explaining the severe 
and long-lasting effects of the tsunami on the overall credit supply to affected areas. Therefore, 
in the period immediately following a natural disaster, government agencies should prioritise 
resources to the most affected areas. These resources include the provision of direct financial 
support via cash payments, and loans to affected households and firms at preferential interest 
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rates. Second, in the longer run, the government should develop a well-functioning private 
insurance market so that disaster risk can be shared across economic agents and thus, to some 
extent, mitigated. A highly penetrated insurance market would increase the number of firms 
and households to be covered by insurance and encourage banks to supply credit because 
insurance acts a safeguard against disaster losses and loan repayment failures. This would also 
help reduce the burden on public finances (which are likely to be more limited in developing 
countries). Third, banks should be incentivised to locate branches in areas vulnerable to 
disasters, so as to be better placed to provide funding to households and firms in the aftermath 
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Notes: This figure presents the geographic location of provinces affected by the tsunami in Thailand based on data 
from the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (2006). Figure 1.1 shows the epicentre of the earthquake that 
generated the Indian Ocean tsunami on 26th December 2004 and the geographic location of Thailand. Figure 1.2 
highlights six provinces affected by the tsunami in the Southern region. The severely affected provinces are 
coloured black (Krabi, Phannga and Phuket) while mildly affected provinces (Ranong, Satun and Trang) are in 
(dark) grey. The unaffected locations are in white. The severity is classified based on estimated losses and damages 








Figure 2. Changes pre- and post-tsunami in aggregate bank lending in affected and unaffected provinces  
 
 
Notes: This figure compares changes in bank lending among the unaffected, mildly affected and severely affected 
provinces in Thailand after the Indian Ocean tsunami of 26th December 2004. Bank lending is measured by the 
percentage change in aggregate bank loans in province p between month t and (t-1). The provinces hit by the 
tsunami and severity are based on data from the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (2006). The unaffected areas 
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Notes: This figure shows the difference-in-differences (DiD) between bank lending in provinces affected and 
unaffected by the tsunami over m months after the tsunami (m = 1, 2, 3,…, 23). The difference is indicated by the 
regression coefficients 𝜖𝜖𝑚𝑚  (between severely affected and unaffected) and 𝜋𝜋𝑚𝑚 (between mildly affected and 
unaffected). These coefficients are estimated from Equation (3). The dependent variable is bank lending measured 
by the percentage change in aggregate bank loans in province p between month t and (t-1). The provinces hit by 
the tsunami and severity are based on data from the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (2006). The unaffected 
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Table 1. The economic impact of the tsunami in affected provinces  
 
Group Province 









(1) + (2) 
Severely affected 
provinces 
Phuket 10.4 79.7 90.1 
Krabi 15.4 53.3 68.7 
Phangnga 42.0 25.9 67.9 
Mildly affected 
provinces 
Ranong 4.2 12.0 16.2 
Satun 3.4 2.8 6.2 
Trang 0.8 5.2 6.0 
Average Severely affected 22.6 53.0 75.6 
Mildly affected 2.8 6.7 9.5 
All-affected 11.5 38.2 49.7 
 
Notes: This table presents the economic impact of the tsunami in Thailand. It is constructed based on data from 
Table 5.2 (p.21) in the report on the economic impact of the Indian Ocean tsunami in Thailand by the Asian 
Disaster Preparedness Centre (2006). The total impact is the cumulative damages and losses of three sectors: 
social sector (housing, education and health), production (agriculture, livestock, fisheries, industry, commerce and 
tourism), and infrastructure (water supply, electricity, transport and communications and others). The affected 
provinces are ranked in the order of severity, which is indicated by the total impact over the provincial economic 







Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A. Unaffected provinces      
Loan growth 1,656 0.0080 0.0219 -0.2147 0.2140 
Bank branch 1,656 3.3131 0.7134 2.0794 5.1240 
Deposit 1,656 0.0064 0.0175 -0.1476 0.1533 
Trend 1,656 0.0112 0.0122 -0.0486 0.0607 
Panel B. Mildly affected provinces    
Loan growth 72 0.0014 0.0152 -0.0619 0.0464 
Bank branch 72 2.7689 0.3932 2.4849 3.3322 
Deposit 72 0.0067 0.0149 -0.0279 0.0558 
Trend 72 0.0123 0.0230 -0.0486 0.0607 
Panel C. Severely affected provinces    
Loan growth 72 0.0009 0.0692 -0.4707 0.0764 
Bank branch 72 3.4213 0.4432 3.0445 4.2195 
Deposit 72 0.0124 0.0169 -0.0294 0.0620 
Trend 72 0.0123 0.0230 -0.0486 0.0607 
  
Notes: This table summarizes a statistical description of the variables used in our study. ‘Loan growth’ is used to 
measure bank lending and is defined as the percentage change in aggregate bank loans in province p between 
month t and (t-1). ‘Branch’ is the natural logarithm of the number of branches in province p at month t. ‘Deposit’ 
is the percentage change in aggregate bank total deposits in province p between month t and (t-1). ‘Trend’ is the 
percentage change in aggregate bank loans in region r between month t and (t-1). Aggregated bank data at 
province-level are obtained from the Bank of Thailand’s statistics on financial institutions. Provinces affected by 
the tsunami are identified using data from the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (2006). The time horizon used 
is 24-month around the Indian Ocean tsunami, which occurred on 26th December 2004. Table 1 and Figure 1 




Table 3. Differences pre- and post-tsunami in aggregate bank lending between affected and unaffected 




Affected provinces Unaffected provinces  
Post- Pre- Diff1 
(= Post – Pre) 
Post- Pre- Diff2 
(= Post – Pre) 
(Diff1 – Diff2) 
Mean -0.008 0.010 -0.018** 0.009 0.007 0.002 -0.020*** 
Std. Dev. 0.068 0.015  0.026 0.016   
Obs. 72 72  828 828   
 
Notes: This table reports univariate tests of the differences in lending (measured by loan growth) between affected 
and unaffected provinces in the pre- and post-tsunami periods. Loan growth is defined as the percentage change 
in aggregate bank loans in province p between month t and (t-1). Pre- and post-tsunami indicate the 12-month 
period before and after the tsunami on 26th December 2004, respectively. The provinces hit by the tsunami are 
classified based on data from the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (2006). Further details are provided in Table 
1. Diff1 (Diff2) is the difference in loan growth between the post- and pre-tsunami periods in affected (unaffected) 




Table 4. Differences pre- and post-tsunami in aggregate bank lending between affected and unaffected 
provinces: regression analysis 
 
Dependent variable: Loan growth  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Loan in affected provinces x post-tsunami -0.022** -0.019*   
 (0.011) (0.011)   
Loan in severely affected x post-tsunami   -0.043*** -0.041*** 
   (0.013) (0.013) 
Loan in mildly affected x post-tsunami   -0.003 0.003 
   (0.003) (0.004) 
Bank branch 0.058*** 0.094*** 0.070*** 0.113*** 
 (0.017) (0.024) (0.017) (0.023) 
Deposit 0.026 0.006 0.021 -0.000 
 (0.026) (0.039) (0.026) (0.040) 
Trend 0.615*** 0.746*** 0.608*** 0.748*** 
 (0.129) (0.234) (0.128) (0.234) 
Observations 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 
R-squared 0.224 0.238 0.237 0.252 
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
 
Notes: This table reports the difference-in-differences in bank lending in all-affected, severely-affected and 
mildly-affected against unaffected provinces. The dependent variable is loan growth measured as the percentage 
change in aggregate bank loans in province p between month t and (t-1). The main independent variable of interest 
is the interaction between the tsunami-affected provinces and the months following the tsunami. The estimation 
is based on 24-month time horizon around the tsunami as shown in Equation (1) (results in Column 1 and 2) and 
Equation (2) (results in Column 3 and 4). Robust standard errors clustered at province level are in parentheses. *, 









Table A.1. Differences pre- and post-tsunami in aggregate bank lending between affected and unaffected 
provinces: controlling for demand side effects 
 
Dependent variable: Loan growth (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Loan in affected provinces x post-tsunami -0.022* -0.018+   
 (0.011) (0.011)   
Loan in severely affected x post-tsunami   -0.045*** -0.042*** 
   (0.014) (0.013) 
Loan in mildly affected x post-tsunami   -0.003 0.004 
   (0.003) (0.004) 
Bank branch 0.072*** 0.114*** 0.091*** 0.142*** 
 (0.025) (0.036) (0.025) (0.032) 
Deposit 0.002 -0.029 -0.005 -0.040 
 (0.031) (0.060) (0.032) (0.061) 
Trend 0.589*** 0.804*** 0.578*** 0.806*** 
 (0.136) (0.281) (0.135) (0.280) 
Corporate project 0.002 -0.000 0.002 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Corporate investment value 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 
R-squared 0.258 0.281 0.275 0.302 
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
 
Notes: This table reports the difference-in-differences in bank lending in all-affected, severely-affected and 
mildly-affected against unaffected provinces. The dependent variable is loan growth measured as the percentage 
change in aggregate bank loans in province p between month t and (t-1). The main independent variable of interest 
is the interaction between the tsunami-affected provinces and the months following the tsunami. The estimation 
is based on 24-month time horizon around the tsunami as shown in Equation (1) (results in Column 1 and 2) and 
Equation (2) (results in Column 3 and 4). ‘Corporate project’ is the natural logarithm of the monthly number of 
new projects approved in a region. ‘Corporate investment value’ is the natural logarithm of the monthly value (in 
million THB) of total investment projects approved in a region. These data are obtained from the Office of the 
Board of Investment of Thailand. The number of observations drop because data on corporate investment are not 
available for the Central region (25 provinces). Robust standard errors clustered at province level are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. + denotes 




Table A.2. Differences pre- and post-tsunami in aggregate bank lending between affected and unaffected 
provinces: different time horizons 
 
Dependent variable: Loan growth  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Loan in severely affected x post-
tsunami  
-0.050*** -0.048*** -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.102*** -0.103*** 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.028) 
Loan in mildly affected x post-
tsunami  
0.004 0.009** 0.016** 0.018*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) 
Bank branch 0.077*** 0.117*** 0.078* 0.100** 0.083 0.072 
 (0.027) (0.034) (0.044) (0.046) (0.089) (0.088) 
Deposit -0.040 -0.078 -0.132* -0.170** -0.239** -0.294*** 
 (0.041) (0.056) (0.070) (0.072) (0.102) (0.108) 
Trend 0.677*** 0.796*** 0.871*** 0.835*** 0.845*** 0.809*** 
 (0.155) (0.268) (0.256) (0.276) (0.259) (0.262) 
Observations 1,350 1,350 900 900 450 450 
R-squared 0.243 0.257 0.331 0.340 0.438 0.441 
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
Notes: This table reports the difference-in-differences in lending between affected and unaffected provinces using 
different windows around the tsunami. The dependent variable is loan growth measured as the percentage change 
in aggregate bank loans in province p between month t and (t-1). The main independent variable of interest is the 
interaction between the tsunami-affected provinces and the months following the tsunami. The estimation is based 
on 18-month (results in Column 1 and 2), 12-month (results in Column 3 and 4) and six-month time horizon 
(results in Column 5 and 6) around the tsunami as shown in Equation (2). Robust standard errors clustered at 









Table A.3. Differences pre- and post-tsunami in aggregate bank lending between affected and unaffected 
provinces: artificially designated tsunami dates 
 
 Dependent variable: Loan growth  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Loan in severely affected x post-tsunami -0.011 -0.011 0.010 0.012 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Loan in mildly affected x post-tsunami -0.006 -0.007 0.002 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) 
Bank branch 0.000 -0.012 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) 
Deposit 0.100 0.129* 0.080 0.095 
 (0.065) (0.068) (0.050) (0.063) 
Trend 0.835*** 0.740*** 0.847*** 0.705*** 
 (0.072) (0.155) (0.067) (0.158) 
Observations 1,650 1,650 1,650 1,650 
R-squared 0.260 0.272 0.244 0.250 
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
 
Notes: This table reports the difference-in-differences in lending between affected and unaffected provinces using 
artificial tsunami dates. The dependent variable is loan growth measured as the percentage change in aggregate 
bank loans in province p between month t and (t-1). The main independent variable of interest is the interaction 
between the tsunami-affected provinces and the months following the artificial tsunami date as shown in Equation 
(2). The tsunami date is falsified to have occurred one year (in December 2003) (results in Column 1 and 2) and 
two years (in December 2002) (results Column 3 and 4) before the actual tsunami date. We narrow the time 
horizon down to 22 months (from February 2003 to November 2004 inclusively) for the fictional event in 
December 2003 to avoid potential effects of the real tsunami that occurred in December 2004. Robust standard 
errors clustered at province level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 







Table A.4. Differences pre- and post-tsunami in aggregate bank lending between affected and unaffected 
provinces: artificially designated affected provinces 
 
 Dependent variable: Loan growth  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Loan in severely affected x post-tsunami 0.004 0.009* 0.002 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Loan in mildly affected x post-tsunami -0.004 0.003 0.001 0.006 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) 
Bank branch 0.039* 0.085*** 0.040* 0.084*** 
 (0.023) (0.030) (0.023) (0.031) 
Deposit 0.032 0.012 0.032 0.012 
 (0.026) (0.037) (0.026) (0.037) 
Trend 0.623*** 0.768*** 0.622*** 0.761*** 
 (0.134) (0.244) (0.133) (0.243) 
Observations 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 
R-squared 0.211 0.229 0.210 0.229 
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
 
Notes: This table reports the difference-in-differences in lending between affected and unaffected provinces using 
artificial tsunami-affected provinces. The dependent variable is loan growth measured as the percentage change 
in aggregate bank loans in province p between month t and (t-1). The main independent variable of interest is the 
interaction between the artificial tsunami-affected provinces and the months following the actual tsunami date as 
shown in Equation (2). In this robustness test, the affected provinces are assigned incorrectly while the actual date 
remains unchanged. We first artificially designate provinces that share borders with the actual tsunami-affected 
provinces as affected. The results are reported in Column 1 and 2. This designation allows us to see if there are 
spill-over effects from potential shocks within the affected region other than the tsunami. Second, we assign 
randomly 75 provinces into three groups of severely affected, mildly affected and unaffected. The results are 
reported in Column 3 and 4 (this assignment is designed to detect if there are shocks that affect bank lending 
beyond the province affected by the tsunami). Robust standard errors clustered at province level are in parentheses. 







Table A.5. Differences pre- and post-tsunami in aggregate bank lending between affected and unaffected 
provinces: collapsed time periods 
 
Dependent variable: Loan growth   (1) (2) 
Loan in affected provinces x post-tsunami -0.015**  
 (0.007)  
Loan in severely affected x post-tsunami  -0.026** 
  (0.011) 
Loan in mildly affected x post-tsunami  -0.004** 
  (0.002) 
Bank branch 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Deposit 0.099 0.176 
 (0.235) (0.193) 
Trend 0.183 0.164 
 (0.182) (0.183) 
Observations 150 150 
R-squared 0.254 0.300 
Province fixed effects No No 
Month fixed effects No No 
 
Notes: This table reports the difference-in-differences in bank lending in all-affected, mildly-affected and 
severely-affected against unaffected provinces. The dependent variable is loan growth which is the average of the 
percentage change in aggregate bank loans in province p of the 12 months pre- and post-tsunami period separately. 
The main independent variable of interest is the interaction between the tsunami-affected provinces and the 
months following the tsunami. The estimation is based on Equation (1) (results in Column 1) and Equation (2) 
(results in Column 2). Robust standard errors clustered at province level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 




Table A.6. Differences pre- and post-tsunami in aggregate bank lending between affected and unaffected 
provinces using neighbouring provinces as a control group 
     
Dependent variable: Loan 
growth   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Loan in severely affected x post-
tsunami 
-0.050*** -0.043** -0.058*** -0.050** -0.073*** -0.069*** 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) 
Loan in mildly affected x post-
tsunami 
-0.004 0.006 0.004 0.014* 0.014* 0.022** 
(0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
Bank branch 0.132*** 0.158*** 0.163** 0.187** 0.215** 0.270** 
 (0.041) (0.051) (0.061) (0.075) (0.085) (0.105) 
Deposit -0.200 -0.426* -0.391* -0.713*** -0.585* -0.864*** 
 (0.145) (0.206) (0.198) (0.225) (0.283) (0.242) 
Trend 0.686*** - 0.751*** - 0.915** - 
 (0.218)  (0.244)  (0.344)  
Observations 336 336 252 252 168 168 
R-squared 0.308 0.338 0.315 0.351 0.377 0.402 
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
Notes: This table reports the difference-in-differences in lending between affected and unaffected provinces using 
unaffected provinces in Southern region as a control group. Six out of 14 provinces in this region are affected by 
the tsunami. As a consequence, the control group includes eight provinces. The dependent variable is loan growth 
measured as the percentage change in aggregate bank loans in province p in Southern region between month t and 
(t-1). The main independent variable of interest is the interaction between the tsunami-affected provinces and the 
months following the tsunami. The estimation is based on 24-month (results in Column 1 and 2); 18-month (results 
in Column 3 and 4) and 12-month time horizon (results in Column 5 and 6) around the tsunami date as shown in 
Equation (2). Robust standard errors clustered at province level are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 






Table A.7. Differences pre- and post-tsunami in aggregate bank lending between affected and unaffected 
provinces using the propensity scores matched sample as a control group 
 
 
Dependent variable: Loan 
growth   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Loan in severely affected x post-
tsunami 
-0.079*** -0.064*** -0.099*** -0.086*** -0.103*** -0.096*** 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.020) (0.015) 
Loan in mildly affected x post-
tsunami 
-0.004 0.011** 0.002 0.011** 0.023 0.025* 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.018) (0.011) 
Bank branch 0.322* 0.472** 0.673* 0.853** 0.571** 0.755** 
 (0.143) (0.121) (0.275) (0.272) (0.176) (0.275) 
Deposit -0.278* -0.895* -0.364** -0.865* -0.700 -1.158* 
 (0.132) (0.374) (0.141) (0.371) (0.387) (0.550) 
Trend 0.888 1.211 1.010 1.196 1.393 1.310 
 (0.503) (0.814) (0.514) (0.835) (0.932) (0.909) 
Observations 144 144 108 108 72 72 
R-squared 0.322 0.400 0.379 0.435 0.414 0.458 
Province fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
  
Notes: This table reports the difference-in-differences in lending using a matched sample between affected and 
unaffected provinces. The dependent variable is loan growth measured as the percentage change in aggregate bank 
loans in province p between month t and (t-1). The main independent variable of interest is the interaction between 
the tsunami-affected provinces and the months following the tsunami. In this robustness test, we employ a 
propensity score matching algorithm to identify matches between provinces that were affected by the tsunami 
with provinces that were not. We first estimate a probit model based on our original sample of 75 provinces in the 
month immediately before the tsunami. The dependent variable equals one if the province was affected by the 
tsunami and zero otherwise. The probit model includes province-variant variables similar to our baseline model 
(Equation 2). However, the variable ‘trend’ is defined as the average growth of loans over three months preceding 
the tsunami (in order to help satisfy the parallel trend assumption). We then use the predicted propensity scores 
and conduct a one-to-one nearest-neighbour matching without replacement to match the tsunami-affected 
provinces with unaffected provinces. The differences in propensity scores are set to be less than 0.01. After 
matching, we have three matched pairs of provinces (the affected provinces are Phangnga, Ranong and Trang). 
We then re-run our estimations on the matched sample using Equation (2). The estimation is based on 24-month 
(results in Column 1 and 2), 18-month (results in Column 3 and 4) and 12-month time horizons (results in Column 
5 and 6) around the tsunami date. Robust standard errors clustered at province level are in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
